Abstract. This article presents an e cient public-key protocol for mutual authentication and key exchange designed for third generation mobile communications systems. The paper also demonstrates how a micropayment scheme can be integrated into the authentication protocol; this payment protocol allows for the provision of incontestable charging. The problem of establishing authenticated public keys through crosscerti cation is addressed.
Introduction

The future of mobile systems
Mobile communications is one of the fastest growing sectors of the IT industry. For example, in Europe the number of mobile users was 22 million in 1995 and is estimated to reach more than 110 million by the year 2000. While current second generation systems such as GSM (cellular, ETS1] ) and DECT (cordless, ETS2]) will continue to play an important role, a new third generation system, the UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunications System) is shortly to be introduced in Europe, with commercial UMTS services expected to commence by 2002 UMTS, ETS3, ITU2] . UMTS will provide a wider spectrum of services than today's systems, ranging from simple voice telephony to high speed, high quality multimedia services, regardless of physical location of the user, using radio frequency access to a convergent network of xed, cellular and satellite components.
Mobile systems security
As for second generation systems, the most fundamental security requirement for UMTS is to ensure that the level of security is at least as high as that in existing wired telecommunications networks. The necessary security features to meet
Protocol goals
The goals to be achieved by the end of a successful protocol run are:
1. mutual explicit authentication of U and V ; 2. agreement between U and V on a secret session key K with mutual implicit key authentication; 3. mutual key con rmation between U and V ; 4. mutual assurance of key freshness (mutual key control); 5. non-repudiation of origin by U for relevant data sent from U to V ; 6. con dentiality of relevant data sent by U to V .
The non-repudiation feature is motivated by the requirement for incontestable charging.
Principles for the selection of security mechanisms
One principle in the design of the protocol was to shift as much computational e ort as possible from the user side to the network side because it is assumed that the user will be represented by a smart card which has limited computational capabilities. Another principle was to allow for messages that are as short as possible. A way to arrive at shorter messages is the use of elliptic-curve cryp- tosystems Mene] . While the protocol does in no way mandate the use of these cryptosystems, it is designed in such a way that their advantages can be best exploited. Another way to arrive at shorter messages is the use of a streamlined certi cate format which provides certi cates much shorter than X.509 certicates. (For more details see Sect. 4.2.) The choice of the security mechanisms was guided by the following considerations: non-repudiation of data sent by the user requires a digital signature system on the user side. This signature system is then also used for authentication of the user for e ciency reasons. For session key establishment, a key agreement scheme (similar to the ElGamal scheme ElGa]) with implicit key authentication ISO3] of the network was chosen because then entity authentication of the network can be obtained with little extra cost. (See discussion in Sec. 2.5 below.) The protocols were chosen in such a way that their description is independent of the choice of the signature systems used by the user and the certi cation authority, respectively. They are also independent of the choice of the nite group in which the exponentiations required in the key agreement scheme are computed.
Prerequisites Cryptographic functions
We assume that the following cryptographic functions can be executed by any participant:
{ A symmetric encryption function where fMg K denotes the encryption of message M with key K. We assume that the cryptographic algorithm is resistant against known cryptanalytic attacks such as code-book attacks and chosen plaintext attacks.
{ A (pseudo-) random number generator. { Functions h1, h2 and h3 which are speci ed below. { Multiplications in a nite group G with generator g, (e.g., the multiplicative group of a nite eld or a subgroup of an elliptic curve), in which the Discrete Logarithm Problem is hard.
Further prerequisites { The identity idV of V is assumed to be known to U at the start of the protocol.
{ V has long-term secret and public key agreement keys v and g v respectively,
where g is as above.
{ U possesses an asymmetric signature system with secret signature transfor- Here, we explicitly list the requirements on the functions h1, h2 and h3. The followingde nitions are useful here: de nitions 1, 2 and 3 are well-known MvOV, p. 323 .] , while de nitions 4 and 5 are weak forms of the MAC-property and of pseudo-randomness which we believe are su cient in our context. Concatenation is indicated by k.
1. A function h is preimage resistant (one-way), if for essentially all outputs y = h(x) it is computationally infeasible to nd any input x 0 with y = h(x 0 ) (x 0 may or may not be equal to x). 2. A function h is partial-preimage resistant (local one-way), if for essentially all outputs, if part of the input is known it is still hard to nd the remainder, i.e. it is not easier than brute-force. 3. A function h is collision resistant (strong collision resistant), if it is computationally infeasible to nd two inputs x 0 6 = x which are mapped to the same value y = h(x) = h(x 0 ). There are a number of practical cryptographic functions which are assumed to be at least collision resistant, e.g., SHA-1 FIPS,ISO2], RIPEMD-160 DoBP, ISO2] and ISO/IEC 10118-2 ISO2]. It is common practice in cryptographic applications to assume that these hash functions are also preimage and partial-preimage resistant, though this issue needs further investigation. Due to MvOV, p. 331] hash functions should not be used as pseudo-random functions unless the randomness requirements are \clearly understood". This does not contradict our assumption that a practical hash function ful ls our de nition 5, (see corresponding note following de nition 5). Let h be one of these well-known hash functions. Then we claim that the functions2. h2(x) := trunc(n; h(x)) where trunc(n; y) returns the n least signi cant bits of y (n being signi cantly shorter than the length of the hash value, but long enough to prevent successful guessing At the start of the protocol (see Fig. 1 ), U generates a random number u and then computes g u which he sends to V , together with the identity idCAV (see remark on certi cate veri cation keys in Sect. 2.5).
On receipt of the rst message, V does not know with whom he is communicating. V generates a random number r, computes (g u ) v and then a session key K := h1((g u ) v kr). He demonstrates knowledge of the session key K by computing the hash value h2(Kkrk idV ) which he sends to U, together with r, his certi cate certV and additional data needed as input to the payment scheme (a time-stamp TV and charging-relevant data ch data).
On receipt of the second message, U computes the key K = h1((g v ) u kr). He then checks the hash value h2(Kkrk idV ) and he thus knows that V actually has the session key K. U generates random numbers IV and 0 , computes T = F T IV ( 0 ) and signs the hash value of the concatenation g u kg v krk idV k ch data k TV k T k IV. Here, F IV , T , 0 , T and IV have signi cance only for the payment scheme, not for the protocol goals stated above, and are therefore explained in Sect. 3 below. U concatenates the signed hash with his certi cate certU and with T and IV . U then encrypts the concatenated parameters with K. On receipt of the third message, V rst deciphers the message elements using K. He retrieves the certi cate certU, and after the veri cation of the certi cate, he can verify U's signature. V stores the signature and the corresponding message for later use in the payment scheme (see Sect. 3 below).
2.5 Discussion General Key con rmation and authentication of V : the inclusion of h2(Kkrk idV ) in the second message gives key con rmation from V to U and hence, together with key freshness (cf. remark 3 below) and implicit key authentication of V , also entity authentication of V (see, for example, RuvO]). Note that explicit key con rmation demands that the session key is used in the key distribution itself 1 .
Key con rmation and authentication of U: the encryption of the certicate certU with K in the third message provides key con rmation. The inclusion of g u kg v kr in the signed part of the third message provides implicit key authentication from U to V as it con rms the origin of g u and links this value to g v and r. The inclusion in the signed part of the third message of the random number r generated by V provides entity authentication of U.
Replay of old keys and key freshness: the key K is constructed using the random number r generated by V in order to prevent an old key K being forced on V by U. This, together with the use of the random number u generated by U, guarantees key freshness to both sides.
Non-repudiation: U's signature provides non-repudiation of the signed data.
Note also that in order to achieve non-repudiation it has to be ensured by other means that the certi cate certU of U is valid. Furthermore, in order to achieve non-repudiation, it may be required in addition that V submits Sig U (: : :) to a trusted time-keeper who signs Sig U (: : :) together with a timestamp and returns it to V . Otherwise, U could repudiate a signature claiming that the signature was generated by an impostor after the certi cate had been revoked. Whether this additional measure should be implemented, however, depends on the security policy and on a trade-o between a higher security level and additional e ort.
Con dentiality of the data in the third message: it is ensured by encrypting the data with the symmetric encryption function using K.
Encryption of the signature: the signature is encrypted for two reasons. Firstly, in order to guarantee that the signer knows the session key K. Secondly, in order to protect the user's identity; if the signature would not be encrypted, an attacker would be able to detect the identity of U by verifying the signature. This might be possible in a scenario where the attacker has access to the public keys of the users and he assumes that the originator of the signature is one of a small group of users (here`small' depends on the time needed to verify a signature).
Inclusion of idV in the second message: this prevents so-called source-substitution attacks (as described in MvOV, remark 12.54]). (These can also be 1 Some protocols do not use the session key in the key distribution protocol itself in order to avoid leaking information on the session key. Such leaking of information on the session key is minimized in our protocol by the inclusion of random numbers in the encrypted messages and by the assumptions on the symmetric encryption function.
avoided by making sure that the TTP checks that the user is in possession of the corresponding private key before it issues a certi cate on the public key. The inclusion of idV is simpler and prevents the need to detail the duties of a TTP in this context.)
Inclusion of idV in the third message: idV must be included in order to indicate the intended recipient of the signature. This is related to the use of the signature in the payment scheme: the signature, together with payment tokens sent in the payment protocol (see below), serves as a proof of payment. So, anyone who intercepts the signature and the tokens and presents them to the broker of the payment scheme could collect money fraudulently.
Certi cate veri cation keys: since U has limited space for storing public keys, U will not be able to verify certi cates issued by an arbitrary certi cation authority. Therefore, in the rst message, U tells V the identity idCAV of a certi cation authority CAV (certi cation authorities CAV1, CAV2, .. .) whose certi cates he is able to verify. We assume that V has got a certi cate issued by this authority (one of these authorities). If this is not the case then an extended version of the protocol has to be run to obtain such a certi cate (see Sect. 4.1).
Identi cation of multiple users: when the protocol is run concurrently by many users it is necessary to identify which message belongs to which user. This problem is assumed to be taken care of by the underlying communication system and, hence, need not be addressed by the security protocol. Temporary channel identi ers can be used to provide user anonymity.
Possible attacks and the choice of the properties of h1, h2 and h3
The weak pseudo-randomness property makes h1 suitable for key derivation in our context. Note that only one session key K is derived from the master key g uv . Furthermore, the proposed protocol avoids the following attacks: an attacker Eve may try to forge the second message in three ways by attacking the function h1 or the function h2 or the concatenated function H (see 3. below):
1. Eve may try to nd a valid pair (r; K) = (r; h1(g uv kr)). If she could do that she could compute h2(Kkrk idV ) from this. This is impossible by the weak MAC-property of h1 because she does not know g uv .
2. Eve may try to nd a valid pair (r 0 ; h2(Kkr 0 k idV )), possibly after having seen the valid pair (r; h2(Kkrk idV )) generated by V . But this would not help Eve because when U tries to verify the forged second message (r 0 ; h2(Kkr 0 k idV )), U computes K 0 = h1(g uv kr 0 ) which by the weak pseudorandomness of h1 is almost certainly di erent from K for r 6 = r 0 . U's veri cation would be successful only if h2(K 0 kr 0 k idV ) = h2(Kkr 0 k idV ), but then Eve would have generated a valid pair (r 0 ; h2(K 0 kr 0 k idV )) without knowing K 0 and without having seen another valid pair involving K 0 , in contradiction to the weak MAC-property of h2. 3. Eve may attack the concatenated function H(L; r) := h2(h1(Lkr)krk idV ) directly and may try to nd a valid pair (r 0 ; H(g uv ; r 0 )), possibly after having seen the valid pair (r; H(g uv ; r)), generated by V . However, Eve would then also have generated a valid pair (r 0 ; h2(K 0 kr 0 k idV )) where K 0 = h1(g uv kr 0 ), and K 0 6 = K almost certainly by the weak pseudo-randomness of h1, hence this contradicts the weak MAC-property of h2.
3 The Payment Protocol
General
There is a recognised need for so-called micropayment systems, that are suitable for the e cient payment of small, frequently recurring, variable amounts. Applications range from electronic publishing to metering, telecommunications and information services and video-on-demand. A series of payments should be made to the same vendor over a period of time so that the vendor can aggregate the individual payments and spread the cost for clearing them with the broker over a larger number of payments. The micropayment system presented here is based on Pedersen's tick payment protocol. For a detailed discussion, the reader is referred to Pede], however we summarise its main features. The novelty is not the payment protocol itself, but the way in which it is integrated with the authentication protocol proposed for the mobile system UMTS (cf. Sect. 1) and the payment scenario for basic and value added services in UMTS. The cryptographic mechanism employed in the tick payment protocol is based on Lamport's password . The proposed system has two phases: an initialisation phase in which the payer (in our scenario the user of a value added UMTS service) commits to initial values of the payment scheme by a digital signature, and an actual payment phase in which payments are made to the payee (in our scenario a UMTS value added service provider or VASP) by successively releasing preimages of an initial value T under a one-way function F . Initialisation is performed as part of the authentication protocol described in the previous section. The meaning of the parameters signed in the third message of that protocol and the detailed working of the tick payment protocol performed in the payment phase are described in the following.
Goals
From the payer's point of view
1. a payment in his name can be made only by him; 2. the amount of the payment is exactly what the payer has speci ed; 3. only the payee speci ed by the payer can receive the payment.
From the payee's point of view:
4. a payee can verify the correctness of a payment; 5. the payer cannot deny having made a veri ed payment; 6. the payee can be certain of being credited for veri ed payments by the broker.
From the broker's point of view:
7. the broker can verify the correctness of a payment.
Prerequisites
For the tick payment protocol, we have the following prerequisites: { There is a public system parameter T which gives the maximum number of ticks (the currency unit of the payment system, reminiscent of phone ticks) to which the user can commit himself by one signature.
{ There is a public family F of length-preserving one-way functions F IV : f0; 1g n ! f0; 1g n , where n is a public system parameter and IV is an initialisation vector. (To be more precise, the functions F IV need to be one-way on T -th iterates, cf. Pede].) Both F and T have to be chosen with care in order to avoid certain attacks (see discussion in Sect. 3.5). In the \authentication and initialisation of payments" protocol, the user commits to the parameters idV , ch data, TV, T and IV. Parameter idV is the identity of the payee (the VASP V ), ch data gives the conditions under which the payment is made (such as applicable tari etc.), TV is a time-stamp generated by V , giving date and time of day, IV is an initialisation vector by which the user selects a particular function F IV from the family F of one-way functions, 0 is a random number selected by the user and T = F T IV ( 0 ) is the initial value for the tick payments. All payments made are multiples of one \tick". Whenever V requests a payment from U, he sends a message to U with the requested number d of unit payments (ticks) to be made. U responds by releasing preimages of T = F T IV ( 0 ) under the function F IV . For the payment of the rst d1 ticks, the user sends the payment token T ?d1 = F T ?d1
Tick payment protocol description
IV ( T ?d1 ) = T . For the payment of the next d2 ticks, the user sends the payment token T ?d1?d2 = F T ?d1?d2 IV ( 0 ), V checks if F d2 IV ( T ?d1?d2 ) = T ?d1 , and so on. Only the last value received from the user has to be stored by V , together with the signature in the third message of the \authentication and initialisation of payments" protocol. If the total number of requested ticks exceeds the maximum amount T to which the user can commit himself by one signature, then either the \authentication and initialisation of payments" protocol has to be run again or, preferably, a simpli ed re-initialisation protocol is run which has only two messages and does not repeat mutual authentication. This re-initialisation protocol is not presented in this contribution for lack of space. V can aggregate the payments from a single user, and clear the aggregated payments with the broker of the payment system, by presenting the signature by which the user committed to the initial values of the payment process and the last tick payment T ?d made by the user. The VASP V is then credited d ticks by the broker.
3.5 Discussion Achievement of goals 1. A payment in the user's name can be made only by him because he commits to the starting value T by his signature, and only he can know the preimages of T under the one-way function F IV , provided the one-way function is appropriately selected. For the same reason, the payer cannot deny having made a veri ed payment. 2. The amount of the payment is exactly what the payer has speci ed: again, this depends on the appropriate choice of the one-way function, see the discussion in Pede]. 3. The identity idV of the payee is included in the user's signature, therefore only the payee speci ed by the payer can receive the payment. 4. The payee veri es the correctness of a payment by verifying the signature and verifying that the d-th iterate of the one-way function F IV applied to the payment token received last equals the payment token received before (the starting value T respectively), where d is the amount due. 5. The payee can be certain of being credited for veri ed payments by the broker because payee and broker, as well as any arbiter, can verify payments (provided of course that an agreement exists that the broker honours veriable payments). The broker can verify the correctness of a payment in the same way as the payee.
Further issues
1. Re-use of starting value T : a payer could use the same starting value T in two di erent sessions, either with the same payee or with a di erent payee. This is to be strictly avoided by the payer as it would be to his disadvantage: assume that he pays for a total of d1 ticks in the rst session and a total of d2 ticks in the second. The payees could then for both instances claim max(d1; d2) from the broker (provided they could intercept the communication), and the broker would have no way to check. 2. Re-use of initialisation vector: the purpose of using a whole family of oneway functions instead of just one function is to make it much harder for a fraudulent payee to invert the one-way function by brute force with the help of pre-computations. Therefore, a user should avoid re-using IV. 3. Check for double submission: note that the signed commitment contains idV and r, hence the commitment is di erent for each session and payee. The broker checks for double submission of the same payment by comparing idV and the nonce r in the signed commitment with previous commitments. If there is a match the broker refuses to honour the payment. No checking for double spending is required of the payee V . (Note that the checking by the broker could also be done using TV instead of r, provided that the granularity of TV is ne enough.) 4. Collision resistance is not required for the function F IV : it does not help a fraudulent payee if he is able to generate collisions for F IV because the starting value T is given to him by the payer. 5. The maximum amount T cannot be arbitrarily large. Rather, F and T must be chosen such that the probability that F IV 
TTP Related Issues
The protocol in Sect. 2 assumes that the user and the VASP possess the public keys necessary to verify each other's certi cates, or that they possess an authenticated copy of each other's public keys. However, if this is not the case, the parties might have to contact an on-line TTP during the protocol in order to obtain a cross-certi cate. Moreover, contacting an on-line TTP also allows for checking whether the certi cate of the other party has been revoked. First the protocol with on-line TTP is described, and next the di erent options for crosscerti cates are sketched. Due to space constraints, the protocol is only brie y described.
Protocol with on-line TTP
The protocol in Fig. 3 di ers from the protocol in Sect. 2 in the following aspects: U also sends to V the identity idTTP of his TTP, together with his own identity idU encrypted with the key L := g uw where g w is the public key agreement key of the TTP. Together with the time-stamp, the TTP signs the unique certi cate identi ers cidU and cidV as well as g u . The TTP Sends TT, the (partly encrypted) cross-certi cate chain and the encrypted signature to V , who then forwards the encrypted signature and the cross-certi cate for his public key to U. U can verify the freshness of the signature by the TTP since it also includes g u (note that U may not have a reliable clock). It is assumed that the user knows the unique identi er number of the certi cate on his own public key and on that of V so that he can verify the received signature. If the signature is correct, the user sends the nal message to V , which also includes the key L encrypted under the key K. Using the key L, V can decrypt the answer received from the TTP in the third step and verify the signature. It is assumed that V has a reliable clock, so he can verify TT. Note: this protocol has the property that V can only verify the signature of the TTP after the last step, which results in some additional delay. If this is not acceptable, the user can add in the rst message a MAC computed with a key derived from L on idU and idV (as an opponent will only see a single (text, MAC) pair for a given key, the required MAC property is weak { but slightly stronger than the weak MAC property discussed in Sect. 2.3). In that case the encryption in the fourth message can use the key K and there is no need to send L in the fth message. However, this latter solution does not provide protection on the interface between V and TTP.
Cross-certi cates and TTP scenarios
The protocol in Sect. 4.1 uses cross-certi cate chains. Such chains are required when parties in the protocol do not have the same TTP, or when the parties do not have on-line access to their TTP. Here CertChain(X; Y ) consists of a sequence of certi cates, c 0 , c 1 ,... , c n , where the signer of certi cate c 0 is the Certi cation Authority (CA) of entity X, the subject of c i is equal to the signer of c i+1 (0 i < n), and the subject of certi cate c n is entity Y . Such a certi cate is veri ed starting with c 0 (using the public key of the CA of entity X); this guarantees the public key required to verify c 1 , etc. The veri cation is completed after veri cation of c n . In order to speed up the veri cation process and reduce the communication overhead, the CA of entity X might also verify the complete chain, and then create a new certi cate for entity Y . However, this provides slightly di erent guarantees to the entity verifying the cross-certi cate. For the protocol of Sect. 4.1, a CA structure where the CA of a user (the TTP) and the CA of a VASP V always cross-certify one another, will provide short certi cate chains. Under this assumption | which is, of course, not necessary for the correct functioning of the protocol | we have: { CertChain(U; V ) consists of a cross-certi cate signed by the user's TTP, and certV .
{ CertChain(V; U) consists of a cross-certi cate signed by V 's CA, and certU. { CertChain(V; T ) consists of a cross-certi cate signed by V 's CA, and a certi cate on the signature key used in Sig T by the user's TTP. Of course the protocol can be simpli ed if U and V have the same TTP. Moreover, one can also consider the case where V contacts his own TTP, rather than that of the user. In that case the user should send its certi cate certU over the air interface in the rst protocol step, reducing the e ciency of the protocol and compromising user identity con dentiality.
Choices for Cryptographic Algorithms and Certi cate Formats
The protocol and cryptographic mechanisms were chosen in such a way that they are particularly suited to the low bandwidth and low computational capabilities on the user's smart card. The payment protocol itself is very lightweight; the elementary payment operation does not require any public-key operation. The authentication protocol is (essentially) identical to one proposed to ETSI for UMTS user-to-network authentication ETS4]. The cross-certi cation approach is chosen in order to minimise communication overheads.
Cryptographic algorithms
The use of elliptic-curve cryptography allows for much shorter signatures and keys; some additional storage is required for the system parameters, but this can be minimised by selecting common system parameters. Current estimates Wien] indicate that elliptic curves with a 170-bit subgroup order (which typically corresponds to an elliptic curve over a group with 171... 180 bits) o er a security level comparable to 1024-bit RSA. The signature scheme used is the AMV scheme of ISO/IEC FCD 14888-3 ISO4], but the construction of the RSA based signature scheme of ISO/IEC 9796-2 ISO1] has also been planned as an option for the signature on certi cates. The hash function RIPEMD-128 can be used for h1 and h2 in the authentication protocol; this hash function o ers a performance in between MD5 (the security of which is questionable) and SHA-1 and RIPEMD-160. For collision resistance, 128 bits is on the low side, but for the speci c needs of h1 and h2 in the authentication protocol it certainly provides a high security level. For h3 RIPEMD-160 has been selected. For the tick payment protocol, RIPEMD-160 has been selected, restricted to an output of 64 bits.
Certi cate format
A special certi cate format has been designed that minimises the storage space on the smart card and the bandwidth on the air interface. The size of a public-key certi cate is less than 200 bytes, which should be compared to about 1 Kbyte for a typical X.509 v.1 certi cate ITU1] (and certi cates proposed within IETF). The certi cate allows for all necessary information: version number, serial number, issuer identi er, four validity dates (begin and end of validity and two optional dates for usage of the private key), subject identi er and public key information (algorithm type identi er and a public key value). Other optional elds include key usage, cross certi cate attributes and certi cate path attributes. Similar ad hoc certi cate formats are being used in the nancial sector (e.g., for the EMV speci cations by Europay, Mastercard and VISA).
Related Work
There is a vast literature on authentication and key agreement protocols. For overviews, the reader is referred to MvOV] or RuvO] . A protocol related to the one presented in Sect. 2 is the well-known Station-to-Station protocol with its variations DvOW]. As opposed to our protocol it has longer messages and higher computational requirements, irrespective of the choice of the signature systems used by the user and the certi cation authority, respectively, and the choice of the nite group in which the exponentiations required in the key agreement scheme are computed. Proposals for authentication protocols speci cally designed for mobile systems were made in AzDi, BeYa,LiHa] (see also Chapter 12 in MvOV] for additional references). However, they are either too ine cient for use in UMTS, do not achieve all the protocol goals stated in Sect. 2.1 or do not allow the integration of a payment system as described in Sect. 3 of this contribution. An overview of the ASPeCT trial protocol and some trial details are presented in MaPM].
Conclusion
The protocols presented in this paper provide an e cient way to achieve mutual authentication, key establishment and incontestable charging in a mobile environment. The protocol satis es the needs for UMTS: it requires a low computational load on the user's side and requires only a limited amount of communication. Moreover, it can be extended to a large scale system with multiple TTPs through cross-certi cation.
